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THE VERY UNEASY CASE AGAINST
REMITTANCES: AN EX ANTE PERSPECTIVE*
ADAM FEIBELMAN**

Money that individual migrants send back to their home countries
has become a major source of foreign exchange for many
developing and emerging economies. These remittances now
represent a sizable percentage of the gross domestic product for
many states; for some, remittance inflows are larger than all other
sources of foreign capital. In recent years, scholars, policy makers,
and international financial institutions have tended to view
remittance inflows as a net benefit for recipient countries. Given the
size of these transfers in the aggregate and their relationship to
labor migration, it is essential for policy makers and scholars to
continue to critically assess the effects of remittances and remittance
policies on workers, the states that receive these remittances, and the
states from which these remittances are sent.
This Article argues that the existing literatureon remittances almost
universally underestimates the overall costs and negative effects of
remittances and remittance-driven migration by failing to include
various costs and harms borne by migrating workers and their
families. If these costs were included in efforts to measure the
overall impact of remittance flows, it is at least possible that
remittances and remittance-driven migration would represent a net
loss for some states and their citizens. If the overall impact of
remittances is not positive for any particular state, then policy
makers in that state may want to consider adopting policies to
reduce or limit remittance-driven migration. They might, for
example, avoid or scale back managed labor-migrationprograms.
Depending on the particularcircumstances of their state, they might
also considerpolicies that reduce workers' incentives to migrate for
the purpose of earning money to remit home, including taxation of
remittance flows, currency exchange controls, or liberalization of
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exchange rate policies. At the very least, if states' current policies
affecting capital inflows are based on a comfortable assumption
that remittance inflows are broadly beneficial, this assumption
should be reexamined to explicitly account for the costs and harms
borne by workers and theirfamilies.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, scholars and policy makers have become
increasingly interested in remittances, the money that individual
migrants send back to their home countries, usually to their families
and relatives. Interest in this subject appears to have grown in rough
proportion to the growth in remittance flows. Acknowledging
challenges in measuring remittances,' the World Bank has reported
that global remittances totaled $328 billion in 2008, an increase of
fifteen percent over the previous year; 2 that amount is more than
twice the estimated amount of total global remittances in 2003 and

1. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 86 (2006) [hereinafter GLOBAL

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS], available at http://go.worldbank.org/0ZRERMGA00

(noting,

with understatement, "[t]he quality and coverage of data on remittances leave much to be
desired").
2. See Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra & Ani Silwal, Outlook for Remittance Flows
2009-2011, at 1 (World Bank, Dev. Prospects Group, Migration and Development Brief
No. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter
Outlook for Remittance Flows 2009-2011],
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/
Migration&DevelopmentBriefl0.pdf.
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more than ten times the estimated amount of remittances in 1990.1
Remittances have dropped appreciably in the wake of the current
but at least some current
global financial and economic crisis,
4
estimates forecast a rebound in 2010.
India, China, and Mexico have been the largest recipients of
remittances in recent years.' In 2008, other top recipients included the
Philippines, Poland, Nigeria, Romania, Egypt, Bangladesh, and
Vietnam.6 Perhaps more significant than the overall amount of
remittance inflows, there were at least sixteen countries for which
remittances constituted more than ten percent of the country's gross
domestic product ("GDP") in 2007. 7 For eight of these countries,
remittances were more than twenty percent of GDP;8 and for
Moldova and Tajikistan, they were thirty-eight percent and forty-five
percent of GDP, respectively.9 Furthermore, remittances are larger
than all other sources of foreign capital in many states.1 ° On the
outflow side, the United States is the single largest source of
remittances," followed by other high-income economies."2 What may

3. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 87-88; RALPH CHAMI ET
AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 259, MACROECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES

OF

REMITTANCES

1, 3

(2008)

[hereinafter

MACROECONOMIC

CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES], available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/

259/op259.pdf.
4. See Outlook for Remittance Flows 2009-2011, supra note 2, at 4. Over the last
year, during the current global crisis, there has emerged some evidence of "reverse
remittances," money sent to migrants from their families back home. See infra note 45 and
accompanying text.
5. See Outlook for Remittance Flows 2009-2011, supra note 2, at 2.
6. See id.
2007
(2008),
DATA:
REMITTANCE
WORLD
BANK,
7. See
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/
RemittancesDataNov08(Release).xls; WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES
FACTBOOK 2008, at 15 (2008). The top ten recipients of remittances as a percentage of
gross domestic product ("GDP") were (in order from highest percentage to lowest):
Tajikistan, Moldova, Lesotho, Honduras, Lebanon, Guyana, Jordan, Haiti, Jamaica,
Kyrgyz Republic, El Salvador, Nepal, Armenia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Guatemala, and
Albania. WORLD BANK, REMITTANCE DATA: 2007, supra. For a less comprehensive, but
more recent update on global remittance flows, see WORLD BANK, REMITTANCE DATA:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/3349342008 (2009),
1110315015165/RemittancesDataNov9(Public).xls.
8. See WORLD BANK, REMITTANCE DATA: 2008, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 88 ("Remittances were
larger than public and private capital inflows in 36 developing countries in 2004.").
11. Id. at 89 ("The United States was the largest source country with nearly $39 billion
in outward remittances in 2004."); WORLD BANK, REMITTANCE DATA: 2008, supra note 7
(reporting over $47 billion in outward remittance flows from the United States in 2008, an
amount nearly double that of Russia, the second largest source of remittances).
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be more surprising, however, is that many developing countries have
become significant sources of "South-South" remittances as well,
especially China, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, 3 and Persian
Gulf countries. 4

Generally speaking, commentators, scholars, and policy makers
have viewed this growth in remittances as beneficial for migrants,
their families, their home countries, and their host countries. 5 As one
writer recently described the commentary on this subject, remittances
have been "elevated ...to near celebrity status in the last ten

years."' 6 This literature emphasizes that remittances tend to increase
and smooth individual and household consumption in receiving
countries,17 thereby reducing levels and effects of poverty to some

extent. 18 Such transfers also provide relatively stable, countercyclical
sources of foreign exchange.19 And the migration of laborers
motivated to earn money to remit helps provide an important source
of labor to higher-income countries.2"
This enthusiasm notwithstanding, various scholars and
commentators have acknowledged some evident or potential costs
related to remittances. As with any transfer of funds, there are direct
costs of remitting money across borders, and there is concern that
these costs are not robustly competitive.2' While remittances appear
12. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 89-91. The top ten
remittance-sending countries for 2008 are (in order of most outgoing remittance dollars):
the United States, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Spain, Italy, Luxemburg,
the Netherlands, and Malaysia. See WORLD BANK, REMITTANCE DATA 2008, supra note
7. Remittances are generally driven by the wage differential between high- and lowerincome countries. As the World Bank has observed, "Wage levels (adjusted for purchasing
power) in high-income countries are approximately five times those of low-income
countries for similar occupations, generating an enormous incentive to emigrate."
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xii.
13. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 90.
14. See Outlook for Remittance Flows 2009-2011, supra note 2, at 3.
15. See, e.g., GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xii-xiv;
MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REMITrANCES, supra note 3, at 1.
16. Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008); Jose
Gabilondo, Monetizing Diaspora:Liquid Sovereigns and the Interest Convergence Around
Worker Remittances, 26 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 653, 657-58 (2008).
17. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
19. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 99-100. Remittances are
often countercyclical because migrants tend to send more money to family members in the
wake of economic and other crises in their home countries. See id. Yet, there are also
some early indications that remittance flows may not be as stable or countercyclical as the
existing literature assumes. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
21. See Gabilondo, supra note 16, at 654, 657-58; Rosser, supra note 16, at 29-32. But
see MANUEL OROZCO, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, INTERNATIONAL FLOWS OF
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to improve consumption and alleviate poverty in recipient countries,2
the effect of remittances on other measures of development and
broader economic growth in lower-income countries is much less
clear. There is widespread concern that remittances used for
consumption do not contribute as much as they might to economic
growth or development.23 In fact, they may actually hinder domestic
growth and development by easing pressure on policy makers to
address structural challenges, reducing remittance recipients'
incentives to work,24 undermining countries' resolve to raise domestic
employment levels, contributing to "brain drain" in developing and
emerging economies, and distorting monetary policy making.
As of yet, however, the literature on remittances only glances at
what may be an even greater set of costs and harms experienced by
migrant workers and their families that are attributable to remittancedriven migration. In other fields of inquiry, there is a growing
appreciation of the vulnerability of migrant workers to abuse and
exploitation by recruitment agents, their employers, and other actors
in their home and host countries.25 In addition to such abuse, migrants
and their families back home, especially migrants' children, incur a
variety of negative effects of separation. 26 To a large extent, these are
private costs and harms, borne directly by migrants and their families.
But many of these costs are externalized upon host and, especially,
recipient countries. While the literature on remittances occasionally
acknowledges this broader set of costs and harms,27 it does not
attempt to measure them against the benefits of remittance flows.
This Article argues that, when one combines the remittancedriven costs and harms incurred by migrant workers and their families
with the other detrimental effects of large remittance flows, it is
possible that the net effect of remittances for some countries may be
only slightly positive or even negative. 28 If so, this should alter the
REMITTANCES: COST, COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL ACCESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN-TOWARD AN INDUSTRY SCORECARD 7 (2006), http://www.iadb.org/

news/docs/internationalflows.pdf (describing the increasing degree of competition in
markets for remittance services).
22. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
24. See Rosser, supra note 16, at 24-27.
25. See infra note 100-06 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
28. This is, of course, a highly complex empirical question. This Article does not aim
to establish that the net effect of remittances is in fact negative in any particular context.
Rather, it argues that such a circumstance is at least possible and explores some of the
consequences of that possibility.
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landscape of relevant debates about remittance policy. It would
certainly add urgency to efforts to reduce the various direct and
indirect costs of remittances, and the existing literature tends to focus
on strategies to do so. But the prospect that remittance flows do not
provide net benefits also raises the possibility that, in some contexts,
policy makers should consider attempting to reduce remittance
inflows or to reduce the amount of remittance-driven outward
migration or both.
If these goals are desirable, however, it may be difficult to reduce
workers' incentives or ability to migrate and send remittances home.
As discussed below, sovereign states may be able to limit remittance
inflows by taxing remittances, imposing exchange controls, adjusting
exchange rate policies, discouraging labor migration, or avoiding
programs that facilitate migration. 9 Recognizing the full costs of
remittance-driven migration may have other, less obvious
implications for policy makers in some countries. It may, for example,
affect broader debates in these countries about capital controls. In
general, the promise of growing remittances has tended to weigh in
favor of liberalization in this context.3 ° If remittances do not-or
would not-provide a net benefit to a particular country, however,
then this might eliminate one reason to pursue liberalization and
might even provide some weight in the opposite direction. In other
words, the cost of remittances and remittance-driven migration may
provide additional, if not independent, justification for capital
controls, if such controls could effectively alter workers' incentives to
migrate.
Yet all of these approaches to reducing remittance flows or
remittance-driven migration can be circumvented to some extent.
Thus, while some or all of these policies might meaningfully reduce
remittance-driven migration and remittance flows, they will
presumably require some enforcement costs and impose some costs
on workers who evade them. An even greater concern, however, is
that it may be difficult to alter workers' incentives to migrate without
negatively affecting workers and family members who have already
done so. For workers who are already abroad, policies that increase
the cost or the difficulty of remitting funds will obviously not affect
their decisions ex ante, but they will have a significant impact on their
ability to make inter-family transfers. This could cause real hardship

29. See infra Part III.B.
30. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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and simply add to the costs and harms incurred by migrant workers
and their families.
In sum, this Article argues narrowly that scholars and policy
makers should consider the possibility that remittances might be
worse than a mixed blessing for at least some countries. If so, and if
such countries are currently pursuing or contemplating policies
designed to increase remittance flows, they may want to stop or to
avoid making such efforts. If a country in this situation can adopt
policies to reduce remittance inflows that are consistent with other
goals and without imposing greater harms on citizens who have
already migrated, it should consider doing so. At the very least, it
should be more amenable to otherwise desirable policies even if those
policies have the effect of dampening remittance inflows. This Article
proceeds as follows: Part I describes the primary benefits associated
with remittance flows; Part II describes the costs thereof; and Part III
discusses policy implications of the possibility that the net effect of
remittances on a particular state is negative.
I. BENEFITS RELATED TO REMITTANCES

The literature on remittances emphasizes a variety of benefits
that workers, their families, home countries, and host countries derive
from remittance flows. This Part describes such benefits. The
following Part describes significant costs related to remittances.
A.

Benefits to Workers and Their Households

The most obvious and direct benefit of remitted money is the
effect it has on recipients. Most remittances flow to workers' family
members, increasing those individuals' ability to consume goods and
services.31 In many cases, it also enables them to accrue savings, make
investments, and accumulate capital, especially human capital.32
These flows also enable recipient families to diversify their sources of
income and smooth consumption across periods of other income
loss. 3 3 Furthermore, as remittance recipients consume domestic goods
and services, the beneficial effect of such transfers flows beyond
them. In this way, remittances appear to help reduce poverty among

31. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiii; MACROECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES, supra note 3, at 22-30; Gabilondo, supra note 16, at
659; Rosser, supra note 16, at 11-14.
32. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiii; MACROECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES, supra note 3, at 22-30.
33. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1,at xiii.
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some nonrecipients.34 The World Bank reported in 2006, for example,
that remittances reduced the number of people in poverty in
Guatemala by twenty percent, in Uganda by eleven percent, in
Bangladesh by six percent, and in Ghana by five percent.3 5 As Ezra

Rosser notes, "Remittances have cut extreme poverty in three
countries-Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador-by

more than thirty-five percent and moderate poverty by an average of
nineteen percent, according to a World Bank estimate.

3 6 All

of these

effects appear to vary, however, depending on the economic
conditions of migrants' home countries, on the wage-earning
capacities of the individuals who migrate and send remittances home,
and on the initial financial position of remittance recipients.3 7
B.

Benefits to Home/Recipient Countries
In addition to their potential poverty-reducing effects, countries

that receive significant remittance inflows appear to obtain some
benefits from the sizable inflow of foreign exchange.38 This boost in

foreign exchange improves the country's balance of payments,
buoying its domestic currency and improving the country's creditworthiness for external borrowing.3 9 Significant remittance inflows

appear to have a discernable effect on some countries' exchange
rates 4° and exchange rate policies.41 Compared to other sources of
34. See Rosser, supra note 16, at 14-20. Furthermore, some communities purposefully
channel remittances to civic ventures through "collective remittances," perhaps most
notably through hometown associations. See id. at 17-18.
35. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiii.
36. Rosser, supra note 16, at 16 (citing PABLO FAJNZYLBER & J. HUMBERTO LOPEZ,
CLOSE TO HOME: THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF REMITrANCES IN LATIN AMERICA 13
(2007),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACOFFICEOFCE/

Resources/ClosetoHome.pdf).
37. See id. at 18-19; PABLO FAJNZYLBER & J. HUMBERTO LOPEZ, CLOSE TO HOME:
THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF REMITrANCES IN LATIN AMERICA 12-16 (2007),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACOFFICEOFCE/Resources/

ClosetoHome.pdf.
38. See Gabilondo, supra note 16, at 661-63; Rosser, supra note 16, at 23-24.
39. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv. For an excellent
general description of the calculation of balance-of-payments, the dynamics of this
balance, and the effect of this dynamic on currency exchange rates, see Chantal Thomas,
Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balancing Trade, Finance and
Development in the New Economic Order,15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1249, 1251-55 (2000).
40. See FAJNZYLBER & LOPEZ, supra note 37, at 12; see also Catalina AmuedoDorantes & Susan Pozo, Workers' Remittances and the Real Exchange Rate: A Paradoxof
Gifts. 32 WORLD DEV. 1407, 1413 (2004) (finding that a doubling of per-capita workers'
remittances raises the real exchange rate by twenty-three percent).

41. See, e.g., David Andrew Singer, Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes
in the Developing World 3 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 3.1, 2008), availableat
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capital, remittances are conventionally thought to be relatively
stable.42 Many other forms of foreign investment are susceptible to
being precipitously withdrawn

from an economy,4 3 and

most

developing economies are vulnerable to rapid capital outflows in the
event of domestic economic downturn or broader, global economic
shocks.' Until recently, remittance inflows were thought to be
relatively immune to reversal. There is evidence, however, that there
have been some reverse remittances during the current global
economic crisis as money has flowed to unemployed or indebted
family members in high-income countries.45

Furthermore, remittances tend to be countercyclical; inflows
often increase during domestic economic crises or in the wake of
natural disasters. 46 Finally, remittances are generally "unrequited"

because they do not require domestic recipients to provide anything
of value in exchange.47 These aspects of remittances can be crucially

important for countries that are struggling with internal economic
stability, reducing the likelihood and the extent of financial crises and

diminishing the need for foreign aid. For these reasons, international
financial institutions and development institutions have been among
the most enthusiastic advocates for expanding the global flow of
remittances.4 8
Recipient states and communities have adopted various

strategies to increase these benefits or to derive additional ones by
drawing remittance flows into productive channels. These strategies
include

securitizing

remittances,4 9

taxing

remittance

flows,50

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1157403 (finding a correlation between remittance inflows and
fixed exchange-rate regimes).
42. See MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES, supra note 3, at 44.
43. See Christopher J. Neely, An Introductionto Capital Controls, 81 FED. RES. BANK
ST. LOUIS REV. 13, 19-20 (1999).

44. See id.
45. See Outlook for Remittance Flows 2009-2011, supra note 2, at 4.
46. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECrs, supra note 1, at 99.
47. See MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES, supra note 3, at 3. As
discussed below, however, this is a bit misleading because remittances do require the
recipient country to give up the productive time and energy of its workers, citizens, and
family members. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
48. See Gabilondo, supra note 16, at 663. Gabilondo discusses the International
Monetary Fund in particular. See id. at 664-66.
49. See Heather Hughes, Understandingthe Securitization of Worker Remittances, in
MOBILISING

CAPITAL

FOR

THE

POOR:

WHAT

CAN

STRUCTURED

FINANCE

CONTRIBUTE? (Ingrid Matthaus-Maier & J.D. von Pischke eds., forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 1-2, on file with the North Carolina Law Review); GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 101-02; see also Gabilondo, supra note 16, at 656 (noting
"remittance harvesting" policies).
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promoting savings accounts for remittance inflows,5 coordinating
"collective remittances,"52 and issuing "diaspora bonds."

3

To date,

such strategies are either nascent or sporadic, and most remittances
continue to flow directly to family members.' But the domestic fiscal
and macroeconomic effects of such flows are still significant in
recipient countries. Even if countries do not tax inflows directly, for
example, they can presumably receive some tax revenue from
transactions that inflows make possible.
Remittance-driven labor migration55 can also help alleviate the

effects of underemployment in labor-exporting countries. In this way,
"low-skilled emigration can offer a valuable safety valve for
insufficient employment at home."56 Thus, and for the reasons noted
above, the World Bank generally advocates increasing migration of
57
low-skilled workers and favors "managed migration programs.
According to the Bank, there are "several hundred" bilateral
agreements to facilitate migration of labor.5 8 These programs
potentially help ensure that labor from supplying countries has stable
access to host countries' labor markets and that host countries will
endeavor to provide some basic assistance or protection to migrant
workers.5 9
Migration of high-skilled labor has different potential benefits. In

addition to any remittances they send, such workers can provide their

50. See infra Part III.B.
51. See Alexander C. O'Neill, Emigrant Remittances: Polices to Increase Inflows and
Maximize Benefits, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 345, 355-56 (2001).
52. See Rosser, supra note 16, at 17-18.
53. See Anupam Chander, DiasporaBonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1013-14, 106062 (2001); Posting of Dilip Ratha to People Move, http:/Iblogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/
nepal-announces-a-diaspora-bond (July 30, 2009, 18:33). These are a different kind of
remittance-most significantly, they are not interfamily transfers. They appear to target
higher-skilled workers as well as those who have settled permanently or for longer
periods. As such, diaspora is connected to the "brain drain" problem. See Chander, supra,
at 1061-62; infra note 84 and accompanying text.
54. See MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES, supra note 3, at 28-

29.
55. See Yoko Nimi & Qaglar Ozden, Migrationand Remittances: Causes and Linkages
5 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4087, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=951134 ("[T]he desire to remit also influences the migration level
56. GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiv.
57. See id. at xiv-xv. This may not be as appealing to destination countries as a more
permanent labor supply. And it may make migration and remittance income subject to
uncertainty, because destination countries can stop the program.
58. See id. at 73.
59. See id. at 73-74.
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home countries with access to capital, technology, and knowledge.'
These effects are presumably heightened where high-skilled workers
return to their home countries. Yet these benefits are not dependent
upon these workers' return-these workers can provide a bridge of
access between interests in their home countries and resources
abroad.
C. Benefits to Host/DestinationCountries

Host countries derive some significant benefits from the
availability of migrant labor seeking income to remit homeward. Most
obviously, these destination countries receive a source of labor,
reducing the direct cost of labor.61 While this may result in lower
wages for native workers in host countries, the lower cost of labor
may also result in higher returns to providers of capital.62 This
explains, in large part, why commercial interests in developing
countries tend to favor liberal immigration policies. Furthermore, it
appears that native workers obtain indirect benefits from the higher
returns to capital.63 There is evidence that the presence of migrant

labor in a host country actually raises the overall income of native
workers to some extent.' It is also possible that increased inward
labor migration may decrease the cost of services such as childcare,
thereby enabling more native workers to enter the workforce.65 As a
result of these various factors, the World Bank has found that inward
labor migration appears to provide a net beneficial effect to native
workers.66 Furthermore, the presence of high-skilled migrant labor
also provides valuable talent and high-demand skills to host
countries.67 These workers also provide important connections for the
host country back to the workers' homes that can potentially facilitate
trade and cross-border investment.
II. COSTS RELATED TO REMITTANCES

Despite the benefits of remittances and remittance-driven
migration described above, there are potential direct and indirect
60. See id. at xiv.
61. See id. at 44.
62. See id. at 43-45.
63. See id. at 45.
64. See id. at xii.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 44-45.
67. See id. at 66-67; Robert E. B. Lucas, International Labor Migration in a
Globalizing
Economy
9-10
(Carnegie
Paper
No.
92,
2008),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/internationalmigration globalizing-economy.pdf.

1782

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

costs associated with both phenomena. Many of these potential costs
are widely recognized in the literature on remittances, but some are
not.
A.

Costs to Home/Recipient Countries

While remittance inflows appear to have a discernable effect in
reducing poverty in recipient countries,68 the literature on remittances
acknowledges that their effect on broader measures of economic
growth and development is unclear.69 This is due in part to the fact
that remittances are largely used for household consumption.7 °

Furthermore, some of this consumption and expenditure is for goods
and services (childcare, for example) that are made necessary because
of the migration of workers in the first place.71 Consumption is
generally considered to be much less productive than savings or
investment in financial capital, human capital, and other assets.7 1 It is

also worth noting that remittance inflows can create or exacerbate
underlying tensions between those who do and do not receive
remittances in workers'

home countries. 73 Responding to these

problems, a significant theme in the literature on remittances is the
desirability of promoting the productive use of money remitted to
migrants'

home countries.74 As noted above, strategies in this

direction include "collective remittances," securitizing remittances,
diaspora bonds, and specialized deposit accounts for remitted funds.75
68. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
69. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiii; MACROECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES, supra note 3, at 1-2; Rosser, supra note 16, at 20-28;
see also Sarah Gammage, Exporting People and Recruiting Remittances: A Development
Strategy for El Salvador?, 33 LATIN AM. PERSP. 75, 94-96 (2006), available at
http:/ilap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/6/75
("As a development strategy,
exporting people is likely to be self-defeating in the long run."). But see generally Reena
Aggarwal, Ash Demirgiq-Kunt & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Do Workers'
Remittances Promote Financial Development? (World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. 3957,
2006),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDSContentServerWDSP/IB/2006/06/28/000016406_20060628102507fRendered/PDF/wp
s3957.pdf (finding that remittance inflows can promote financial sector development).
70. See MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES, supra note 3, at 28.
71. See id. at 28-29; Adam Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy as Development Policy,
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 63,75 (2009).
72. See, e.g., ROBERT COURTNEY SMITH, MEXICAN NEW YORK: TRANSNATIONAL
LIVES OF NEW IMMIGRANTS 50-52 (2006) (discussing the divide between the "remittance
bourgeoisie" and those who do not receive remittances in migrants' home countries).
73. See Rosser, supra note 16, at 20.
74. See, e.g., GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xv-xvi; O'Neill, supra
note 51, at 357-59. But see Rosser, supra note 16, at 41-61 (critiquing the
"institutionalization" of remittances for development goals).
75. See supra notes 49-53.
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Perhaps more troubling, however, is that the benefits of
remittances described above may undermine a recipient country's
need and motivation to pursue tough development policies. Countries
that receive large inflows of remittances may not act as aggressively to
attract other, more productive forms of foreign capital or to improve
balance of payments. Similarly, while the outflow of low-skilled labor
may alleviate underemployment in the short term, it may undermine
attention to policies that address pervasive underemployment in the
long term, a much harder project. A recent World Bank report on
remittances acknowledges as much, noting: "In the long run ...
developing country policies should aim to generate adequate
employment and rapid growth, rather than7 6relying on migration as an
alternative to development opportunities.
Furthermore, remittance inflows can unleash macroeconomic
forces that can have some negative consequences for various interests
in recipient countries. These inflows can, for example, lead to
inflation,77 resulting in higher prices for goods and services. If
remittances lead to currency appreciation,78 this may reduce the cost
of imports, but it can also hurt domestic exporters, who may be more
important for countries' longer-term growth and development.7 9
As a result of these macroeconomic effects, remittances may also
distort domestic monetary and exchange rate policies. Countries may
try to increase remittances and remittance-driven migration-or
respond to remittance-driven currency appreciation-by taking
official actions to keep exchange rates relatively low compared to
host country currencies.8' There is also evidence that countries with
76. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiv.
77. See Rosser, supra note 16, at 21.
78. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
79. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 21-22.

80. Although exchange rates are not generally observed to be a key determinant of
remittance flows, there is evidence that such flows are in fact responsive to exchange rates.
See, e.g., M. I. T. EI-Sakka & Robert McNabb, The Macroeconomic Determinants of
Emigrant Remittances, 27 WORLD DEV. 1493, 1496 (1999) (finding that workers abroad

are sensitive to exchange rate uncertainty); O'Neill, supra note 51, at 356 (noting that
states have aimed to increase remittance flows by offering "premium exchange rates");
Jose Uribe, Impacts of Remittances from the United States on Recipient Latin American
Economies, 11 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 33, 36 (2005) ("Just like any capital flow then,
remittances will respond to favorable rates of returns and sustainable and stable exchange
"); Ibrahim A. Elbadawi & Robert de Rezende Rocha, Determinants of
rates ....
Expatriate Workers' Remittances in North Africa and Europe 10 (World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1038, 1992), available at http://go.worldbank.org/
6EIMA51ZRO ("[L]arge exchange rate misalignments [between official rates and 'black
market rates'] can divert a substantial volume of remittances away from official channels
and towards parallel markets, despite the existence of incentives, such as preferential

1784

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

large remittance inflows are more likely to adopt or retain fixed
exchange rates.81 Yet doing so tends to reduce policy makers' control
over monetary policy,' and it may increase the likelihood that
exchange rates will fall into disequilibrium with underlying economic
conditions. More generally, the large inflows of foreign exchange
from native workers abroad may undermine the need for countries to
adopt policies that would help them integrate effectively with
international capital markets.
Finally, remittance-driven migration of high-skilled labor may
hurt home countries more than it benefits them. While such migration
may increase the home country's access to capital, information, and
technology,83 it also causes a loss of beneficial externalities associated
with high-skilled workers and citizens-the brain drain effect.' Highskilled workers are valuable at home for many reasons. They can help
design and implement public and private ventures that promote
economic growth and development, they can generate innovation,
they can provide domestic counterparties for foreign interests, and
they can serve vital leadership roles in social and political spheres.
B.

Costs to Host/DestinationCountries

It is also not entirely clear that inward labor migration is always a
net benefit for host countries. It may decrease labor costs for host
country ventures and may increase overall wages for host-country
natives, but these benefits may not be spread evenly within the host
country. Some laborers in the host country will likely have to compete

interest rates or exchange rates."); Caroline L. Freund & Nikola Spatafora, Remittances:
Transaction Costs, Determinants, and Informal Flows 34 (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 4087, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=803667 (finding that
exchange rate volatility has some affect on remittance flows); Nouriel Roubini, Are
Capital Controls in Fashion Again?, FORBES.COM, Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/
2009/10/28/capital-controls-emerging-markets-renminbi-opinions-columnists-nourielroubini.html (noting, for example, that "[t]he Philippines will keep on engaging in
competitive devaluation due to its dependence on remittances").
81. See generally Singer, supra note 41 (finding that countries where remittances
constitute a substantial portion of GDP are more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates and
arguing that the remittance flows compensate for some loss in domestic monetary policy
flexibility).
82. See id. at 12-27.
83. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
84. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiv. For a good general
discussion of issues related to "brain drain," see generally Lisa Leiman, Comment, Should
the Brain Drain Be Plugged: A Behavioral Economics Approach, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 675
(2004).
85. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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with migrant labor, often unsuccessfully.86 Not all native workers will
derive the indirect benefits of lower overall labor costs and any
resulting economic growth. In addition, there is evidence that existing
migrant workers in a destination country may experience welfare
These
losses from the entrance of new migrant workers.'
in
the
host
circumstances may not only increase income inequality
country, it will inevitably create some friction between new migrants
and the communities who do not benefit from the increased labor
supply. This may contribute to social friction and, as discussed below,
may increase migrants' vulnerability in their host countries.'
Furthermore, migrant workers presumably consume a wide
variety of public goods and services in their destination countries.8 9
Gains to capital providers described above should compensate at
least somewhat for this consumption. And where migrants pay
income taxes on wages earned in the host country, these taxes also
compensate for some of the public goods they consume.' If the new
migrants earn relatively little (by host-country standards) or if they do
not pay their full tax liabilities, however, it is possible that the value
of the public goods and services they consume may be greater than
the taxes they pay. If so, this reduces the overall economic benefit
they provide to their host countries.
C.

Costs to Migrants and Families

Although remittances appear to increase the consumption and
improve the welfare of recipients, this benefit must be considered
along with a variety of costs, often hard to observe and measure, that
these recipients and their migrant relatives incur. To the extent that
workers are motivated to migrate by the hope of earning money to
remit back home, the promise of remittances arguably exposes these
workers and their families to these costs and harms. The most obvious
set of remittance-related costs are the direct costs of actually
transferring money back home. Formal and informal financial
intermediaries siphon off significant portions of the total amount of
global remittances. 91 These direct costs generally include fees for the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See
See
See
See
See
See

GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at xiii.

id. at 44-45.
infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 39-41.
id.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 136-37; MACROECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF REMITTANCES, supra note 3, at 62, 81; Gabilondo, supra note 16, at
656-57; Rosser, supra note 16, at 28-29.
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remittance itself and additional fees for currency conversion. 92
Although there is evidence that formal remittance services have
become more available and more competitive over the years,93 the
costs and fees associated with remittances are still quite high--often
ten to twenty percent of the principal amount being remitted in small
transactions.94 According to the World Bank, the cost of providing
remittance services is considerably lower than the amounts charged to
consumers.

95

The literature on remittances has emphasized these costs in
recent years and has urged policy makers to continue efforts to make
it easier and cheaper for migrants to send remittances to their
families. Doing so involves, among other things, improving access to
formal financial services and increasing competition in the market for
remittance transfer services. 96 It may also be that lowering regulatory
costs and hurdles to potential entrants in this market would increase
the number of formal providers, improve competition, and lower the
costs of sending remittances. 97 The goals of such efforts are twofold
and related: first, to reduce the loss in value of remittances to workers
and their families and, in turn, to increase the total amount of funds
remitted. 9 These goals are related because workers' incentives to
remit money are at least partly a function of the cost of remitting. 99
The literature on remittances tends to under appreciate a wide
variety of other costs borne by workers who migrate hoping to earn
money to send home and those borne by their families. As many of
the contributions to this symposium explore, it is now well
understood that temporary and semipermanent migrants, especially
low-skilled workers, are often highly vulnerable to abuse and
exploitation by their employers abroad, recruitment agents, and their
transporters. 10 0 It is often the case that migrant workers spend
92. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 1, at 136.
93. See supra note 21.
94. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECrS, supra note 1, at 137.
95. See id. at 138-39.
96. See id. at xv-xvi; Gabilondo, supra note 16, at 660; Rosser, supra note 16, at 4-5,
29-41. These concerns have been somewhat complementary with, and somewhat
complicated by, counterterrorism policies focusing on international financial
intermediation. See Gabilondo, supra note 16, at 666-69; Rosser, supra note 16, at 34-37.
97. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECrS, supra note 1, at 145-46. On the other hand,
increasing regulation of informal remittance service providers may raise costs, at least in
the short term. See id. at 146-47.
98. See, e.g., id. at 142-43.
99. See id. at 142.
100. See Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Int'l Labour Conference, Sixth Item on the Agenda:
Migrant Workers, Resolution Concerning a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in a Global
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101
significant amounts of money or incur substantial debt to migrate, 1°2

get paid less than they expected when deciding whether to migrate,

face discrimination and ostracization abroad, 10 3 and enjoy limited
legal protections in their host countries.1 °4 Migrant workers are often
exposed to unsafe or unhealthy conditions in transit;1 5 and a
disturbingly large number of migrants end up in some form of forced
labor arrangements.1" 6

As recent scholarship on the experience of transnational families
has explored, migrant workers and their families often experience
significant emotional and psychological costs due to separation and
dislocation.0 7 Migrants themselves may experience intense loneliness,
depression, and feelings of isolation.' They often live under threat of
deportation, which makes it all the more difficult and risky to bring
their families with them to their host country. 109 Separation and

dislocation

often

disrupt

familial

relationships,110

sometimes

irreparably,"' and appear to exacerbate gender inequalities and to

impose particularly taxing burdens on mothers (especially if they are
the migrating family member) and other female caregivers. 112 Familial
Economy, at 55, para. 5 (2004) [hereinafter ILO Resolution], available at
ILO, Cost of
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relmlilc/ilc92/pdf/pr-22.pdf;
Coercion: Executive Summary of 2009 Global Report on Forced Labour, at 2 (2009)
[hereinafter Cost of Coercion], available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--Janie A. Chuang,
dgreports/---dcomm/documents/genericdocument/wcms_106200.pdf;
Achieving Accountability for Migrant Domestic Worker Abuse, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1627,
1634-36 (2010); David M. Forman, Protecting Philippine Overseas Contract Workers, 16
COMP. LAB. L.J. 26, 62 (1994) (describing the Philippine government's efforts to promote
labor migration that involved significant costs and harms to migrants); Gammage, supra
note 69, at 94.
101. See Gammage, supra note 69, at 95.
102. See ILO Resolution, supra note 100, at 55, para. 5.
103. See id.
104. See id. at para. 7.
105. See Gammage, supra note 69, at 95.
106. See Cost of Coercion, supra note 100, at 3.
107. See, e.g., Rhacel Salazar Parrefias, TransnationalMothering: A Source of Gender
Conflicts in the Family, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1825, 1854-55 (2010); Leah Schmalzbauer,
Disruptions,Dislocations, and Inequalities: TransnationalLatino/a Families Surviving the
Global Economy, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1857,1869-72 (2010).
108. See Schmalzbauer, supra note 107, at 1877-79.
109. See Jacqueline Hagan, Brianna Mullis & Nestor Rodriguez, The Effects of U.S.
Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-BorderPerspectives,
88 N.C. L. REV. 1799, 1813-20 (2010).
110. See Schmalzbauer, supra note 107, at 1875-76 (reporting that "both women and
men told me that what they wanted most was for their families to be together").
111. See id. at 1869-72.
112. See id. at 1865 (noting, for example, that other female family members often
provide care for children of mothers who work abroad).

1788

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

disruptions due to migration also impose costs and harms on the
children of migrant workers," 3 and it stands to reason that some of
those costs and harms will be externalized upon the societies in which
these children grow up.
Only rarely do these costs, risks, and harms appear in the
literature on remittances. When the literature does acknowledge
these remittance-driven costs, it generally does not attempt to
account for them in evaluating the desirability of increasing
remittance flows. 11 4 For example, in a recent prominent study on
remittances, the World Bank noted
[m]igrants, however, incur substantial costs, including
psychological costs, and immigrants (particularly irregular
migrants) sometimes run high risks; many suffer from
exploitation and abuse. The decision to migrate is often made
with inaccurate information. Given the high costs of
migration-including the risk of exploitation and the exorbitant
fees paid to traffickers-the net benefit in some cases may be
low or even negative. There are costs, too, for family members
left behind-particularly children-although these costs must
be balanced against the benefits of the extra income that
1
migrants send back home to their families."
Despite this acknowledgment, however, the World Bank's study did
not consider such costs in assessing the desirability of remittance
flows. Rather, it advocated addressing such costs by improving public
dissemination of information about work opportunities to potential
migrants, perhaps by regulating labor recruitment." 6
D. Summary
Although the literature on remittances tends to emphasize the
benefits of these transfers, it does acknowledge a variety of costs or
potential costs associated with them. It does not, however,
meaningfully consider a broad range of significant costs borne by
migrant workers and their family members back home. Although the
private and social costs of migration and family separation are
increasingly well documented, they have generally not been included
in the cost-benefit calculus of remittance policies. When the promise
113. See Parrefias, supra note 107, at 1851-54; Schmalzbauer, supra note 107, at 1865.
114. One notable exception to this is Gammage, supra note 69, at 94, which cites the
human toll of labor migration as a reason for El Salvador to eschew policies designed to
promote remittance inflows.
115. GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECrS, supra note 1, at xii.

116. See id. at xv.
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of remittances creates a primary incentive for workers to migrate,
however, these costs can be attributed to remittances in some
meaningful sense. At the very least, recognizing this additional set of
costs should make policy makers recalculate the net effect of
remittances at both the micro and macroeconomic level.
This Article proposes, without attempting to prove, that
including these costs raises the possibility that the overall effect of
remittances is negative in some contexts. Given the foregoing
discussion, it is possible to conjecture that the costs of remittances
would be particularly high for countries that, among other things,
have weak development policies, relatively low income per capita,
and weak frameworks of labor protection. Such factors would
presumably tend to increase the likelihood that laborers would be
motivated to risk (or under appreciate) significant costs of earning
income abroad and would increase the likelihood that remittance
inflows would undermine pressure to improve domestic development
policies. Of course, for many countries with such characteristics, the
benefits of remittances may also be particularly high, especially if
remittances provide significant support for the value of these
countries' currencies and credit ratings. This illustrates the fact that
assessing the net effect of remittances and remittance-driven
migration on workers, their home countries, and their host countries
presents an even greater econometric challenge than the literature
currently reflects. Despite this challenge, however, it is extremely
important for policy makers to conduct this analysis because it is at
least possible that, for some countries, the goal of increasing
remittance flows is self-defeating and too costly to their laborers.
III. REDUCING THE Ex ANTE EFFECTS OF REMITTANCES

If remittances and remittance-driven migration might have an
overall negative effect in some contexts, this should at least temper
the conventional enthusiasm for increasing remittance flows. Even if
the net effect of remittances is positive, appreciating the full range of
costs related to these transfers should give policy makers pause. At
the very least, it should underscore the importance of working
aggressively to reduce these various costs. Yet this has already proven
to be a challenging enterprise, made more so by the difficulty of
measuring both costs and benefits of remittances. " 7 If the net effect of
remittances is negative in any context, and the related costs cannot be
reduced enough to significantly improve the net effect, then policy
117. Seesupra note 28.
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makers may want to consider adopting strategies to reduce
remittance-driven migration. This Part describes and evaluates some
strategies for reducing the costs of remittances and for reducing the
amount of remittance flows if that is desirable.
A.

Reducing Costs

As noted above, 118 the existing literature on remittances
acknowledges many of the direct and indirect costs of these transfers
and addresses some ways to reduce the costs or to improve the use of
remittances in home countries." 9 These include reducing the direct

costs of remittance services, 2° improving the productive use of
remittances,' 2 ' and increasing bilateral and multilateral agreements
for temporary labor migration. 122 And beyond the literature on
remittances, other scholars and commentators have advocated a wide
range of policies to reduce123the costs and harms incurred by migrant
workers and their families.
Calls to reduce the costs associated with migration and
remittances appear to couple a basic enthusiasm for remittances with
a concern over associated costs and effects. Thus, a number of writers
have expressed notable skepticism about the extent of the benefits of
remittances for migrant workers and their families, tending to focus
on ways in which workers' home countries may extract value from
124
remittance flows or fail to help reduce the costs of remitting funds.
This growing literature tends to view remittance policies through the
eyes of workers who have already migrated and who desire to send
money home to their families. As a result, this perspective does not

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See supra Parts I, II.A.
See supra notes 49-53 and
See supra notes 91-95 and
See supra notes 49-53 and
See supra notes 58-59 and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.

123. See supra notes 97 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also MANUEL OROZCO, THE
REMIrANCE MARKETPLACE: PRICES, POLICY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2004),

availableat http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/28.pdf (noting that G8 countries committed
in 2004 to work to reduce the transaction costs for remittances and reporting that costs for
such transfers have decreased significantly since the 1990s); Forman, supra note 100, at 45;
Gabilondo, supra note 16, at 655-56 (describing "forced remittance" and "remittance
harvesting" programs that some countries have adopted); Dan Gatmaytan, Death and the
Maid: Work, Violence, and the Filipina in the International Labor Market, 20 HARV.

WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 238-39 (1997) (discussing the Philippines' forced remittance program);
O'Neill, supra note 51, at 352-55 (discussing forced remittance programs); Rosser, supra
note 16, at 37, 40, 60 (discussing taxation of remittances and questioning the role of
remittances in development policy).
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directly examine the question of whether policy makers should
aim to
125
encourage remittance-driven migration in the first place.
For example, Ezra Rosser catalogs some of the direct costs of
remittances and policy makers' desire to harness remittance flows and
expresses skepticism about the development potential of remittance
inflows. He argues that international policy makers should resist the
" 'institutionalization' of remittances" as a development tool; 126 that
remittances are an expression of the love and concern among and
between "transnational families"; and that remittance policy should
be narrowly focused on facilitating this dynamic. 127 Reducing the costs
of remittances, in this view, is desirable for the purpose of enabling
workers and their families to flourish, which is distinguishable from
broader development goals.
Similarly, Jose Gabilondo has observed that remittance policies
reflect an "interest convergence" among home and host countries and
international financial institutions 2 8 that favors increased labor
migration and growth in remittances.129 Gabilondo suggests that this
convergence of interests subordinates the interests of workers and
their families, and extracts value from them. 3 Thus, like Rosser,
Gabilondo critiques the general enthusiasm for increasing
remittances as being too focused on broader benefits to home and
host countries.
Gabilondo appears to go further than Rosser in contemplating
that remittance-driven labor migration might impose costs on workers
that outweigh benefits, yet both authors stop short of proposing that
migrant workers and their families might not obtain a net benefit
from remittances. To be clear, however, neither of these authors
directly addresses the question of whether, or to what extent,
remittance-driven migration is desirable. Rather, these accounts can
be read as part of a broader literature that explores the existing
circumstances of labor migration and remittance policy and generally
aims to improve the conditions under which workers migrate and
send remittances home.
In her article on El Salvador, Sarah Gammage tackles remittance
policy from a more explicitly ex ante perspective, addressing whether
125. But see generally Gammage, supra note 69 (arguing that El Salvador should not
aim to promote remittance inflows).
126. See Rosser, supra note 16, at 6.
127. See id.
128. See Gabilondo, supranote 16, at 660.
129. See id. at 661-64.
130. See id. at 659.
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that country should pursue policies designed to promote labor
migration and remittance inflows.'

She proposes that it should not

do so. In reaching this conclusion, Gammage notes the various
tangible and intangible costs borne by migrating workers and at least
suggests that these costs may outweigh the personal and intra-family
benefits of remittances. 132 This conclusion implicitly acknowledges
that it may not be possible to reduce the costs associated with
remittance inflows enough to justify policies designed to promote
remittance-driven migration. This is at least plausible. It may be
possible to meaningfully reduce some of the costs of remittances and
remittance-driven migration, especially the direct costs of remittance
services and, perhaps, the risk of exploitation to migrant labor. Yet
other costs described above are more structural and arguably
inevitable. These may include some of the macroeconomic effects of
remittance flows (e.g., currency appreciation), the reduction of
incentives for domestic policy makers to improve development
policies, as well as the emotional and social costs of family separation
and dislocation. If such structural or inevitable costs outweigh those
that can be addressed and reduced, this would make it much more
difficult for countries to improve the net benefits of remittance
inflows and related migration.
B.

Reducing Remittances

If it is theoretically possible that remittance flows and
remittance-driven migration cannot be made to provide net benefits
for workers, their families, and their home states, how should policy
makers respond? One implication is that policy makers would want to
attempt to reduce remittance flows or outward migration. For reasons
discussed in the following section, it would presumably be preferable
for policy makers to adopt policies that aimed to reduce workers'
incentives to migrate.
There are a variety of policies that could be employed to achieve
this aim. As noted above, a number of developing and emerging
economies have adopted programs to facilitate temporary labor
migration to higher-income countries, often through bilateral
arrangements with destination countries.'33 To the extent that these

programs encourage or influence workers to migrate who would
otherwise not do so, they increase both migration and remittance
131. See Gammage, supra note 69, at 92-96.
132. See id. at 92-94.
133. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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inflows. And to that extent, countries may be able to directly reduce
remittance-driven migration by avoiding or rolling back these
programs. Doing so could, at least potentially, reduce the various
costs of migration and remittance inflows discussed above. It is
possible, of course, that scaling back these programs could do more
harm than good, especially if they primarily protect workers who
Wuuliu lihgat
.*., tcr.a

y

vc.t.

Directly or indirectly taxing remittances may be even more
effective in reducing remittance-driven migration. But the effects of
such policies are complicated. Taxing remittances presumably
decreases the incentives of workers to migrate for the purpose of
remitting money and reduces the motivation of those who do migrate
for other reasons to send remittances home. Taxing remittances may
also increase the benefits of remittance inflows on recipient countries
because the tax revenues can-again, at least potentially-be
employed by the official sector for productive purposes. Thus, setting
aside any effect on labor migration, taxing remittances may increase
the net benefits of remittances on growth and development in the
recipient country, but may reduce the amount of such "improved"
remittances.
Countries may also be able to affect the amount of remittance
flows through capital controls and exchange-rate policies."' Like

135
taxation, capital controls that increase the cost of remitting money
can potentially reduce remittance-driven migration and related social
costs. And the stronger the controls, the greater this effect should be.
The potential benefits of certain remittance-unfriendly capital
controls in the home country are different than the effects of taxation,
and perhaps even more complicated. Some such controls are often
designed to limit the exposure of the domestic economy to
international financial markets. 136 As such, they generate significant
skepticism and resistance in the international community.
Conventional economic wisdom generally frowns upon barriers to
capital flows, and international financial institutions have strongly

134. See Chander, supra note 53, at 1094-95; Roubini, supra note 80 (discussing the
Philippines' remittance-driven exchange rate policies).
135. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that exchange
controls generally add to the direct cost remittance services).
136. Neely, supra note 43, at 13, 21.
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urged or required their members to liberalize capital controls over the
past few decades.'3 7

Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") have committed themselves to liberalizing
capital controls among themselves and with respect to other members
of the International Monetary Fund ("IMIF").

13 8

The IMF's approach

to capital controls is a bit more complicated. The IMF has been
consistently engaged in encouraging its members to liberalize their
regulation of capital movements.'39 Yet, the institution has limited
formal authority to do more in this regard. 140

Significantly, however, economists and policy makers have
increasingly acknowledged that some capital controls can prove
beneficial in some circumstances. 4 ' By controlling the nature of
inflows and outflows of foreign capital, countries can reduce their
exposure to unstable flows in either direction, though the possibility
of large and sudden outflows are usually a greater concern. 4 ' The
OECD Code explicitly acknowledges that members may need to

impose some controls if a member's "economic and financial situation
137. See, e.g.,
APPROACH

TO

INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, INT'L MONETARY FUND, THE IMF's
3-4 (2005), available at
CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION

http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/pdf/04202005/report.pdf.
138. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD CODE OF
art. 1 (2009), available at
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS,
LIBERALISATION
OF
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/62/39664826.pdf. Subject to the right to make certain
reservations, "[m]embers shall grant any authorisation required for the conclusion or
execution of transactions and for transfers" specified under the Code. Id. art. 2(a). In
addition to personal capital movements, those specified transactions and transfers include
direct investment in new or existing ventures, liquidation of such investment, operations in
real estate, operations of securities in capital markets, operations in money markets and
other financial products, credits and loans, sureties, guarantees, financial backup facilities,
operations in deposit accounts, operations in foreign exchange, and life insurance. Id. at
Annex A, at 27-33.
139. INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, supra note 137, at 3-4.
140. While the International Monetary Fund's ("IMF") Articles of Agreement grant it
authority to promote current account liberalization, the Articles do not extend this
authority to its members' capital accounts. See id. at 3. While there have been efforts to
amend the Articles to expand the IMF's jurisdiction in this direction, this has not occurred.
Id. at 18. Thus, the IMF can engage its members regarding their capital accounts only to
the extent that such activity affects external stability, pursuant to its surveillance authority
under Article IV of its charter. Id. Thus, the IMF has not, for example, "require[d] capital
account liberalization as formal conditionality for use of its resources." Staff Response to
the Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF's Approach to Capital
Account Liberalization,in INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, supra note 137, at 94, 95.
141. See generally Neely, supra note 43, at 13, 19-21 (describing the potential
advantages to developing economies of policies designed to control both inflow and
outflow of capital).
142. Id. at 21.
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justifies such a course," if liberalization would "result in serious
economic and financial disturbance," or if "the overall balance of
payments of a Member develops adversely at a rate and in
'
circumstances ... which [a member] considers serious." 143
While the IMF has generally encouraged its members to increase
their receptivity to international capital, 1" in the past fifteen years or
so it has increasingly recognized the potential destabilizing effects of
capital flows in and out of developing economies. 45 As the IMF's
Independent Evaluation Office has written, "From the beginning of
the 1990s, the IMF's management, staff, and Executive Board were
aware of the potential risks of premature capital account
liberalization and there is no evidence to suggest that they promoted
capital account liberalization indiscriminately. 1 46 Thus, while the
IMF has been "in principle opposed to the use of [capital controls],"
it has come to recognize them as a justifiable "temporary, second-best
instrument."' 4 7
It is unlikely that policy makers will be inclined to impose or
retain controls for the sole purpose of limiting remittances and
workers' incentives to migrate. First of all, remittance flows do not
implicate most of the conventional justifications for such controls. It
is highly doubtful that remittance flows would trigger concerns about
volatility of capital flows. 148 Furthermore, it may be difficult to
narrowly craft such controls to target only remittances and not other
types of transactions.
While policy makers may not consider adopting or retaining
capital controls simply to reduce remittance flows or labor migration,
the costs of remittances may nonetheless be relevant for regulation of
capital flows. Liberalizing capital controls can help enable states to
increase remittance inflows (and, by extension, increase remittance143. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 138, art. 7.
144. See INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, supra note 137, at 3-4.

145. See id.
146. Id. at 4. "As preliminary evidence emerged on the apparent effectiveness of
Chile's capital controls in the mid-1990s, some in the IMF began to take a favorable view
of the use of capital controls as a temporary measure to deal with large capital inflows."
Id.
147. See id. at 5.
148. Remittance flows are generally considered a uniquely stable source of foreign
exchange. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. As noted above, however, there is
evidence that there have been some reverse remittances during the current global
economic crisis in the form of money sent to unemployed or indebted family members in
high-income countries. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Also, to the extent that
diaspora bonds are redeemable, they may add to capital flight in times of crisis along with
other forms of foreign investment. See Chander, supra note 53, at 1069-70.
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driven migration). 4 9 This may be a beneficial by-product of
liberalizing or avoiding controls on capital movements and thus
provide an additional reason to avoid retaining or imposing controls.
If remittances and remittance-driven migration are not a net benefit
for a country, however, this particular justification for liberalizing
controls and against de-liberalization disappears. In fact, the costs of
remittances and labor migration may provide marginal support for
imposing or retaining capital controls that are desirable for other
reasons. In other words, if capital controls are otherwise justifiable, it
may not always be the case that they should be discouraged out of
concern for their potential negative impact on labor migration and
remittance flows.
A similar point can be made about exchange rate policies,
although the implications in this context may point in favor of
liberalization. As noted above, some exchange rate policies-like
fixed exchange rates or devaluation-are correlated with large
remittance inflows and may be adopted or retained in part to
promote remittances and remittance-driven migration. Such policies
are, like other more direct efforts to control capital flows, widely
believed to be inconsistent with capital account liberalization. 5 ' Thus,
it may be that policy makers in some states are resisting liberalization
of exchange rate policies, at least in part, to promote remittance
inflows and remittance-driven migration. If these goals are in fact not
desirable, that may influence exchange rate policies in the opposite
direction and toward liberalization. Again, it may not be the case that
the desire for remittances will provide a state with an independent
motivation for pursuing a particular exchange rate policy. Yet, it may
be a relevant factor in the policy calculus, and policy makers may be
assigning it the wrong value at present.
C.

Plight of Existing Migrants

The points above focus on the ex ante effects of remittance
policy and its effects on migration-the ways that the prospect of
149. See, e.g., The Rise in Remittances to India: A Closer Look, MIGRATION INFO.

SOURCE, Feb. 2007, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=577
(noting that remittance inflows to India coincided with relaxation of currency controls and
other policies designed to liberalize the Indian economy).
150. See, e.g., Miranda Xafa, Monetary Stability, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Capital
Controls: What Have We Learned?, 28 CATO J. 237, 240 (2008), available at

http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj28n2/cj28n2-7.pdf ("Many observers ... consider that
exchange rate flexibility is a precondition for full capital account liberalization."). Xafa,
however, includes herself among "a minority of skeptics who believe that most developing
countries should have fixed exchange rate regimes." Id.
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remittance flows affect incentives for laborers to migrate. Thus, the
above analysis of potential policy responses has considered their
potential for reducing the negative effects of remittances by, for
example, making these transfers more costly or less attractive. But
there are significant ex post concerns as well, especially the effects of
remittance policies on people who have already migrated and their
families. For these individuals, it is too late to affect their decision to
migrate. It is certainly possible to affect their decision to stay abroad,
but the decision to return from abroad is very different from the
decision to leave home in the first place, and it involves a different set
of costs. Even more important, any policy that has the effect of
increasing the cost or difficulty of remitting money home for someone
who is already abroad raises a radically different set of concerns than
the effect of such policies on citizens who are considering migrating.15'
Those who have already traveled abroad are now separated from
their family members, who may now be dependent on them; the
migrants likely made their decisions based on the assumption that
they would be able to send some portion of their income homeward.
The effects on individuals and families who have already migrated
must be factored into any consideration of remittance policies. In
some circumstances, especially for countries that already have large
numbers of citizens living semi-permanently abroad, these ex post
interests will presumably outweigh any ex ante considerations.
CONCLUSION

Given the significant and increasing role of remittance flows in
the global economy, it is essential for policy makers and scholars to
continue to critically assess the role of these flows for workers, the
states that receive their remittances, and the states from which these
remittances are sent. Although the existing literature on remittances
addresses a variety of costs and potentially negative effects of
remittance inflows and remittance-driven migration, the literature
almost universally underestimates these costs and effects. It does so
by failing to attribute the various costs and harms borne by workers
and their families when these workers migrate in order to earn
income to remit home to their families. If these costs were included in
efforts to measure the overall impact of remittance flows, it is at least
possible that remittances and remittance-driven migration would
represent a net loss for some states and their citizens. To be sure,
151. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text discussing the vulnerability of
migrants and their families.
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measuring the full range of remittance-related costs and harms is an
extremely difficult project, especially because some significant costs
are intangible, stemming from the emotional and social effects of
familial separation and dislocation.
The possibility that remittances and remittance-driven migration
do not provide net benefits for some countries raises some
challenging questions for policy makers in developing and emerging
economies. If it turns out that a particular state and its laborers do not
obtain a net benefit from remittance inflows, policy makers in that
state may want to consider adopting policies to reduce or limit
remittance-driven migration. They might, for example, avoid or scale
back managed labor-migration programs. They might also adopt or
retain policies that reduce workers' incentives to migrate for the
purpose of earning money to remit home. Depending on the
particular circumstances of their state, such policies might include
taxation of remittance flows, currency exchange controls, or
liberalization of exchange rate policies. If remittance-related concerns
do not provide sufficient independent reasons for adopting such
policies, they are presumably relevant factors in a broader policy
calculus. At the very least, if states' current policies affecting capital
inflows are based on a comfortable assumption that remittances
inflows are broadly beneficial, this assumption should be reexamined
to explicitly account for the costs and harms borne by workers and
their families.

